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Abstract
1
  
This paper examines continuity and change in European Union behaviour within its interaction with the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) with regard to Myanmar. Since the EU used its connections 
with ASEAN to raise its preoccupations regarding Myanmar, the Association’s behaviour also comes into focus. 
This investigation is linked to the evolution of the EU in world affairs via its political ties to ASEAN. It 
concentrates on the rather abrupt change introduced by the reform process launched in 2011-12, which marked 
the beginning of a new phase. Continuity is observed in the EU’s constant concern that the Myanmar issue did not 
destabilise its relations with ASEAN. Changes have been identified as following into three different phases. It is 
maintained that the aspiration to escape from pervasive China and the desirability of new partners were crucial in 
the realisation of these changes. Official documents from the EU, the European Commission, and European 
Council Conclusions and Common Positions, declarations issued at ASEAN, Asia-Europe and other meetings, 
together with secondary sources and interviews conducted mostly in Myanmar, contribute to this work. Many 
scholars have hinted at the extent to which the case of Myanmar caused problems to the EU-ASEAN links, but no 
emphasis was laid on the extent to which the Myanmar case has conversely helped to reinforce the long-lasting 
EU-ASEAN relationship. This is a novelty that is focused on in this paper.   
 
Key words: EU, EU-ASEAN, ASEM, Myanmar, foreign policy analysis     
 
Introduction  
 
The Republic of the Union of Myanmar has recently become the focus of increasing attention among 
scholars and observers alike.
2
 The 2011-12 reform process, the 2012 by-elections and the transfer of 
power to a civilian, military-sponsored government marked abrupt changes. President Thein Sein (a 
former general, Prime Minister since 2007, and President since March 2011) appeared to be the 
architect of the transformation. The by-elections resulted in a landslide victory for the government’s 
opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Nobel Peace laureate, Daw Aung 
San Suu Kyi. Sein’s government released a number of political prisoners, concluded ceasefire 
arrangements with armed groups in the ethnic regions, signed peace agreements, made efforts to 
eliminate the use of forced labour, recognised labourers’ right to strike, and amended the censorship 
laws.
3
 In January 2013, an international conference was organized in Myanmar, at which the Sein 
government’s timetable for reform over the next three years was unveiled. Yet, the government is 
facing challenges including the need to reform the Constitution, which preserves the military’s 
supremacy over the Cabinet and Parliament
4
 (because it places the National Defence and Security 
Council above the hluttaw, the Burmese Parliament, with 10 of its 11 members being officers or former 
officers).
5
 Sein’s restructuring has been unmatched by the previous government leadership since the 
                                                 
1 A first version of this paper was prepared for the 2013 EUSA AP Annual Conference held in Macau on 17-18 
May, ‘Reassessing the EU-Asia Pacific Relationship in the context of the EU crisis’. The author thanks the 
participants for their constructive comments.   
2 For the country profile, see the EC/Burma/Myanmar Strategy Paper (2007-2013), pp. 5-46. Available at: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/myanmar/csp/07_13_en.pdf; Myint-U, T. (2013) ‘Help Myanmar’s peace talks to transform 
Asia’, Financial Times, 22 November. Bunte, M. and Portela, C. (2012) ‘Myanmar: The Beginning of Reform and 
the End of Sanctions’, policy brief, GIGA Focus International, No. 3, German Institute for Global and Area 
Studies: Hamburg, June.     
3 Censorship laws, however, still exist and are enacted. Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on 
Burma/Myanmar, 3159th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Luxemburg, 23 April 2012. Myint-U (2013) op. cit.  
4 Myanmar’s military (the Tatmadaw) is constitutionally protected and exempted from civilian oversight. Article 
20(b) of the Constitution gives the military complete authority over the ministries of defence, interior and border 
affairs, as it appoints all three ministers. Article 109(b) and 141(b) reserve 25 % of parliamentary seats for the 
military, which in effect gives them a veto over any attempts to alter the Constitution because of the supermajority 
required for revision. Tonkin, D. (2013) EastAsiaForum, 3 May.  
5 MacDonald, A. (2013) ‘The Tatmadaw’s new position in Myanmar politics’, EastAsiaForum, 1st May. Available 
at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/01/the-tatmadaws-new-position-in-myanmar-politics/ 
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coup d’état of 1962. The latter brought to power a military junta (under the official name of the State 
Peace and Development Council, SPDC, successively changed into the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council, SLORC, and again into the SPDC) which ruled the country until 2011. The 
SLORC/SPDC suppressed domestic dissent and exercised absolute power, despite 20 years of 
sanctions imposed by the EU and other international actors. The new developments have been 
acknowledged by the EU as ‘historic improvements’,6 and as ‘a significant step towards further 
democratisation in Myanmar’ (paragr. 87) by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).7 
ASEAN is the regional group of which Myanmar has been a member since 1997. Within ASEAN, the 
European Union raised its concerns about Myanmar and ‘encouraged positive changes’.8   
The transformations in Myanmar gave way to a new phase in the relations with the European Union. 
The European Council suspended the visa ban on cabinet members and other high ranking officials in 
2011, and placed Myanmar under the Everything but Arms (EBA) regime. High Representative Ashton 
opened a EU Office in Yangon, which was later upgraded to a Delegation.
9
 The European Union has 
more than doubled the development aid  (to about 150 million euros for 2012-13), explored the 
feasibility of a bilateral investment agreement and the possibility of reinstating a preferential tariffs 
deal with Yangon. It expanded bilateral trade with Myanmar (226.37 million dollars in 2012) as well as 
Myanmar’s exports to the EU (43.54 million dollars) and imports from the EU (182.83 million 
dollars),
10
 all of which are vital to Myanmar (with a GDP of US$ 876 in 2010).
11
 It allocated initial 
funds to the Myanmar Peace Centre in Yangon (EUR 700,000) in 2012, and further contributed EUR 
30 million in 2013 to the ethnic peace process.
12
 It has agreed to the building up of a lasting EU-
Myanmar partnership.
13
 To turn commitments into reality, a joint Task Force met in Myanmar in 
November 2013,
14
 following the first Myanmar-EU Forum in Nay Pyi Taw in June 2013. The Council 
has indicated that, having imposed sanctions calling for a change, it now feels a responsibility to help, 
and assist the government in rebuilding its place in the international community.
15
  
These developments offer an opportunity to review the EU’s efforts to induce Myanmar’s military 
regime to work towards political transformation. A specific question is addressed:  
 
What are the elements of continuity and change in EU behaviour within its interaction with ASEAN 
with regard to Myanmar? Since the EU has used its connections with ASEAN to raise its 
preoccupations in relation to Myanmar, the Association’s behaviour also comes into focus.  
 
This is an empirical investigation hinging on the evolution of the EU in world affairs via its political 
ties to ASEAN. Continuity is observed in the EU’s constant concern that the Myanmar issue did not 
destabilise its relations with ASEAN. Changes have been identified as following into three different 
phases corresponding to the periods 1991-1997, 1998-2006 and 2007-2012. It is maintained that the 
aspiration to escape from pervasive China
16
 and the desirability of new partners were crucial in the 
                                                 
6 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Burma/Myanmar, 3159th Foreign Affairs Council 
Meeting, Luxemburg, 23 April 2012, op. cit. 
7 Chairman’s Statement of the 20th ASEAN Summit, Phnom Penh, 3–4 April 2012. ASEAN is formed by 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, which are the five founding states, to which later 
Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia also joined, totaling ten members.  
8 European Union External Action, Myanmar.   
9 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Burma/Myanmar, 3159th Foreign Affairs Council 
Meeting, Luxemburg, 23 April 2012. 
10 Myanmar, EU agrees to use forum to advance ties. 20 June 2013. Available at: 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/790343.shtml#.UdrvwpX3AfE 
11 United Nations, National Accounts Main Aggregates Database (http://unstats.un.org/). Kubo, H. (2013) ‘EU-
Asia Trade Relations’ in Christiansen, T., Kirchener, E. and Murray, P. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia, 
Houndmills: Palgrave, 247-262, 257.  
12 EC President Barroso, Minister Aung Min Sign Joint Declaration at Myanmar Peace Centre, Brussels, 3 
November 2012. European Commission, IP/12/1167.   
13 Joint statement by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European 
Commission Jose’ Manuel Barroso and President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar U Thein Sein, 
Brussels, 5 March 2013, EUCO 58/13. Available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/135830.pdf 
14 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-176_en.htm  
15 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on the Comprehensive Framework for the European 
Union’s policy and support to Myanmar/Burma, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 22 July 2013.  
16 Also hatred for India is an issue within Myanmar.  
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realisation of these changes. Official documents from the EU, the European Commission, and 
European Council Conclusions and Common Positions, speeches and declarations issued at ASEAN, 
Asia-Europe and other meetings, together with Southeast Asian and European newspapers, secondary 
sources and interviews conducted in Myanmar in January 2013, including one with a former EU 
Special Envoy for Myanmar and ASEAN leaders, contribute to this work. The text of the relevant 
declarations and Council Common Positions is accessible in the footnotes. Many scholars have hinted 
at the extent to which the case of Myanmar caused problems to the EU-ASEAN links, but no emphasis 
was laid on the extent to which the Myanmar case has conversely helped to reinforce the long-lasting 
EU-ASEAN relationship. This is a novelty that is focused on in this paper. This investigation is 
organised into four main sections, which include the present introduction, the official documents and 
recent publications, the distinct phases in action, and the conclusions.  
 
Official documents and recent publications  
 
How can we explore the European Union’s attention to Myanmar through its connections with ASEAN 
(the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is an offshoot of ASEAN),
17
 and have similar investigations 
already been conducted? A thread is found in the official EU documents and documents by the 
European Commission, namely: the 1994 Communication of the Commission to the Council ‘Towards 
A New Asia Strategy’;18 the 2001 Commission Communication on ‘Europe and Asia:  A Strategic 
Framework for Enhanced Partnerships’;19 the 2003 Communication from the Commission ‘A new 
partnership with South East Asia’;20 the 2007 European Commission’s ‘Country Strategy Paper on 
Myanmar’;21 and the 2013 ‘Comprehensive Framework for the European Union’s policy and support to 
Myanmar/Burma’.22 In these documents, and particularly in the 1994 communication, as the 
Commission itself explains, the term ‘Asia’ includes three sub-regions, one of which is the Southeast 
Asia region. These documents support the following general context.  
The establishment of an important presence in (Asia)/Southeast Asia is claimed to allow the European 
Union to ensure that its interests (in economic and security matters – arms control, non-proliferation 
and the security of the sea lanes, p. 2) are fully acknowledged in this key region (p. 3) (1994 
document). The EU’s intention to raise its political and economic presence across the region to a level 
commensurate with the growing global weight of an enlarged EU is another assertion that is upheld (p. 
3), to which the key priority of further strengthening the long-standing partnership with ASEAN 
contributes (p. 22) (document 2001). The account that economic imperatives for closer cooperation are 
based on the fact that Southeast Asia is set to become one of the most dynamic growth areas in the 
world economy (p. 3) has supported the EU’s proposition to revitalise its relations with ASEAN (p. 3) 
(2003 document). EU Ministers were ready to discuss Burmese matters with their Myanmar 
counterparts at several regional meetings (ASEAN-EU Ministerial, ASEM, or bilaterally at the margins 
of these meetings) (p. 20) (2007 document). The EU’s goals includes assisting Myanmar’s government 
in reestablish its place in the international community (p. 2) and helping it to reap the benefits of its 
integration into ASEAN (p. 4) (document 2013).  These discourses of the EU frame the observation of 
the European Union’s behaviour within EU-ASEAN’s interactions with regard to Myanmar.23  
                                                 
17 Asia-Europe Meeting is considered an emanation of the Association because negotiations for the first ASEM 
summit were carried out through the interregional dialogue channel between ASEAN and the EU (Yeo 2013, 332). 
ASEM reflected ASEAN’s ambition to promote an East Asian regionalism around the ASEAN core (Manea 2013, 
321-2). Yeo, L. H. (2013) ‘The Asia-Europe Meeting’ in Christiansen et al. (eds), op. cit., 330-343. Manea, M. G. 
(2013) ‘The Institutional Dimension of EU-ASEAN Plus Three Inter-regional Relations’, in Christiansen et al 
(eds), op. cit., 313-329.   
18 Communication of the Commission to the Council, COM(94)314, Brussels, 13 July 1994. 
19 Commission Communication on ‘Europe and Asia:  A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships’ 
COM(2001) 469 final, Brussels 4 September 2001.  
20 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Communication from the Commission, A new partnership with 
South East Asia’, Brussels, 9.7.2003, COM(2003)399 final.   
21 The EC/Burma/Myanmar Strategy Paper (2007-2013).  
22 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on the Comprehensive Framework for the European 
Union’s policy and support to Myanmar/Burma, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 22 July 2013, op. cit. 
23 Also ASEAN held interests in EU involvement in the region. Beyond the relevance of economic trade and the 
hope to benefit from the EU experience in regional integration, ASEAN sought to involve the EU to balance the 
weight of (the US and) China. See Cameron, F. (2013) ‘The Evolution of EU-Asia Relations: 2001-2011’, in 
Christiansen et al (eds) op. cit., 30-44, 33.  
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Recent publications  
An examination of the literature in this field reveals that some researchers have considered the EU’s 
relationship to Myanmar, explained how the EU has jeopardised its relations with ASEAN through its 
criticism of that country,
24
 and provided suggestions about how the EU might support reform in 
Myanmar.
25
 An overview of recent developments there,
26
 and a focus on the reforms have also been 
provided.
27
 The issue of weather the EU’s sanctions induce undemocratic governments to change their 
ruling system formed the topic of a case study on Myanmar.
28
 A review of the comprehensive ties 
between the EU and ASEAN, paying brief attention to Myanmar as a permanent point of contention, 
constituted the subject of another recent contribution.
29
 Research on how interaction is central to 
analysing human rights, as part of the process of ASEAN’s identity formation, has also been published, 
shedding some light on the diplomatic incidents and tensions that arose when the EU embarked on a 
region-to-region interaction with Myanmar.
30
 The argument that the EU’s targeted (rather than full) 
sanctions allowed the EU member states to protect their commercial and/or political interests in 
Myanmar was also sustained (p. 158).
31
 An evaluation of ASEM in its first decade (including both how 
it has been considered as the way out of the EU-ASEAN deadlock on Myanmar and how it has been 
challenged by the crisis) was made available.
32
 The issue of Myanmar’s inclusion in the 2004 ASEM 
enlargement has been explored.
33
 An investigation of EU-ASEAN ties with attention to values, norms 
and culture, and also to Myanmar is accessible.
34
 The view that ASEAN’s intra-regional and inter-
regional human rights interactions with Europe are mutually dependent was discussed with ample 
reference to Myanmar.
35
 The argument of how the EU-ASEAN relationship may turn out to be not only 
rich in declarations but also of a substantial character has been considered, though Myanmar was dealt 
with only briefly.
36
  
 
Other publications have centred on EU ASEAN links, or on ASEM, but not all of them have paid 
attention to Myanmar. The kind of lessons that the EU could learn from ASEAN have been 
explained,
37
 and the EU’s limited strategic approach to Asia has been criticised.38 Reflections on 
                                                 
24 duRocher, S. B. ‘The European Union, Burma/Myanmar and ASEAN: A challenge to European norms and 
values or a new opportunity?’, Asia Europe Journal, 10, 2012, pp. 165-180.  
25 Parello-Plesner, J. ‘How the EU can support Reform in Burma’, ecfr.eu, 2012, pp. 1-9.    
26 Rieffel, L. (2012) ‘Myanmar on the Move: An Overview of Recent Developments’, Journal of Current 
Southeast Asian Affairs, 4: 31-49.  
27 Bunte and Portela (2012) op. cit.     
28 Portela, C. (2010) European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy. When and why do they work? London: 
Routledge. Portela, C. and Vennesson, P. (2013) ‘Sanctions and Embargoes in EU-Asia Relations’ in Christiansen 
et al (eds), op. cit., 198-210.  
29 Brettner-Messler, G. (2012) ‘EU and ASEAN – The Interregional Relationship between Europe and Asia’, in 
Gareis, SB., Hauser, G. and Kernic, F. (eds) The European Union: A Global Actor?, Opladen/Farmington Hills: 
Budrich Publishers: 138-160.  
30 Manea, M. G. (2009) ‘How and Why Interaction Matters: ASEAN Regional Identity and Human Rights’, 
Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 44, No. 1: 27-49.  
31 Smith, K. E. (2006) ‘The Limits of Proactive Cosmopolitanism: The EU and Burma/Myanmar, Cuba and 
Zimbabwe’, in Elgstrom, O. Smith, M. (eds) The European Union’s Roles in International Politics. Concepts and 
Analysis, London: Routledge.  
32 ‘ASEM in its Tenth Year: Looking Back, Looking Forward’, European Background Study, University of 
Helsinki, 2006.  
33 Fitriani, E. (2013) ‘ASEM and Southeast Asian countries’ foreign policy. Study case: The issue of Myanmar in 
the 2004 ASEM enlargement’, ISEAS Singapore, 1-37.  
34 deFlers, N. A. (2010) ‘EU-ASEAN Relations: The Importance of Values, Norms and Culture’, Working Paper 
No. 1, EU Centre in Singapore.  
35 Manea, M. G. (2008) ‘Human rights and the interregional dialogue between Asia and Europe: ASEAN-EU 
relations and ASEM’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 21, No. 3: 369-396.   
36 Moeller, J. O. (2007) ‘ASEAN’s Relations with the European Union: Obstacles and Opportunities’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 29, No. 3: 465-482.   
37 Mahbubani, K. (2012) ‘Can the EU learn lessons from ASEAN?’  
http://www.mahbubani.net/articles%20by%20dean/can-the-eu-learn-lessons-from-asean.pdf. T. 
38 Engelbrekt, K. (2012) ‘The Missing Link in the EU's Nascent Strategic Approach toward Asia: Military 
Diplomacy’, Asia-Pacific Review Vol. 19 No. 2. 
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different aspects of EU-Asia relations were included in a handbook,
39
 and a selection of topics from an 
interdisciplinary perspective concerning these relations was made available.
40
 Further studies sought to 
shed light on the importance of ASEM from a European perspective,
41
 and examined the EU’s foreign 
policy in the Asia Pacific region.
42
 A less recent work explored the EU in Southeast Asia together with 
its ties to ASEAN.
43
 While Casarini made no reference to Myanmar, Zhou and Forster did so only 
indirectly.   
 
Other analysts have studied Sino-Myanmar relations explained how China emerged as the most 
important foreign actor in Myanmar after the Western boycott of its industrial and agricultural sectors
44
 
and examined how a series of events, since mid-2011, including the rapid improvement of Myanmar’s 
relationship with the West, have ‘frustrated’ China’s aspiration to engage in a ‘loyal friend’ partnership 
with Myanmar.
45
 Other observers have focused on the potential sources of instability that Myanmar 
faces in its surrounding region, which could threaten its neighbours, including China.
46
 A further work 
centred on Myanmar’s President Sein’s priorities and civil society’s role in representing the popular 
interests,
47
 while yet another analysed the problem of democracy in Myanmar.
48
 Explanations of how 
the recent political changes in Myanmar came about,
49
 and how peace prospects may evolve, with a 
strong emphasis on human right claims, have also been offered,
50
 together with an exploration of the 
major trends in Foreign Direct Investment in Myanmar (1989-2011).
51
 A brief hint at Myanmar in its 
geopolitical complexity considered in the security regionalism of the Asia-Pacific area was proposed.
52
 
The argument that ASEAN’s failure to take a stronger line on Myanmar has less to do with its non-
interference norms than with the interests of the region’s illiberal elites has been sustained.53 An 
analysis of how different socio-economic interests shape foreign policy in the ASEAN states is 
accessible, with a focus on the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus.
54
 A recent extensive 
examination of all of the developments which have characterised Myanmar over the years, including its 
participation in ASEAN, is now available.
55
 Less recent analyses but still important are the focus on the 
complex relations between Myanmar and ASEAN,
56
 together with the discussion of Myanmar’s 
                                                 
39 Christiansen et al. (eds) (2013) op. cit.   
40 Novotny, D. and Portela, C. (eds) (2012) EU-ASEAN Relations in the 21st Century. Strategic Partnership in the 
Making, New York, Palgrave. 
41 W. Zhou, ‘Beyond A Trade Agenda: EU’s Interregional Approach Towards East Asia’, European Foreign 
Affairs Review, Vol. 16, 2011, pp. 407-426. 
42 Casarini, N. (2012) ‘EU Foreign Policy in the Asia Pacific: Striking the Right Balance Between the US, China 
and ASEAN’, EUISS Analysis, pp. 1-6.    
43 A. Forster, ‘The European Union in South-East Asia: continuity and change in turbulent times’, International 
Affairs Vol. 75, No. 4, 1999, pp. 743-758.  
44 Swanstrom, N. (2012) ‘Sino-Myanmar Relations: Security and Beyond’, Institute for Security and Development 
Policy, Stockholm, pp. 1-25.    
45 Sun, Y. (2012) ‘China’s Strategic Misjudgment on Myanmar’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 1, pp. 
73-96.  
46 Kurlantzick, J. (2011) ‘Myanmar: Sources of Instability and Potential for US-China Cooperation’, Council on 
Foreign Relations.   
47 M. Thuzar, ‘Myanmar: No Turning Back’, Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 1, 2012, pp. 203-219.  
48 Steinberg, D. (2012) ‘The Problem of Democracy in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar: Neither Nation-
State Nor State-Nation?’, Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 1, pp. 220-237.  
49 Hlaing, K. Y. (2012) ‘Understanding Recent Political Changes in Myanmar’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 
Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 197-216.  
50 South, A. (2012) ‘The Politics of Protection in Burma. Beyond the Humanitarian Mainstream’, Critical Asian 
Studies, Vol. 44, 2, pp. 175-204. Kramer, T. (2012) ‘Ending 50 years of military rule? Prospects for peace, 
democracy and development in Burma’, NOREF Report, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, pp. 1-14.   
51 Bissinger, J. (2012) ‘Foreign Investment in Myanmar: A Resource Boom but a Development Bust?’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 23-52. 
52 Hughes, C. (2007) ‘New Security Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific: Extending Regionalism from Southeast to 
Northeast Asia’ The International Spectator Vol. 42, No. 3: 319-335.   
53 Jones, L. (2008) ‘ASEAN’s Albatross: ASEAN’s Burma’s Policy, from Constructive Engagement to Critical 
Disengagement’, Asian Security Vol. 4, No. 3: 271-293.     
54 Jones, L. (2009) ‘Democratization and foreign policy in Southeast Asia: the case of the ASEAN Inter-
Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 3: 387-406.   
55 Haacke, J. (2012) ‘Myanmar: now a site for Sino-US Geopolitical Competition?’, LSE IDEAS, Haacke, J. 
(2010) ‘The Myanmar imbroglio and ASEAN: heading towards the 2010 elections’, International Affairs, Vol. 86, 
1, pp. 153-174.   
56 Haacke, J. (2007) ‘Myanmar and ASEAN’ The Adelphi Papers 46:381, 41-60.  
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foreign policy goals before 2007.
57
 Also, the way in which ASEAN might have affected political 
change in Myanmar has been the subject of study,
58
 as well as ASEAN’s diplomatic and security 
culture with regard to Myanmar.
59
 Yet, none of these works made any mention at all of the European 
Union. 
  
It is true, therefore, that Myanmar has become the focus of increasing attention among scholars and 
observers alike. However, an observation of the evolution of EU behaviour within EU-ASEAN’s 
interactions with regard to Myanmar (through the reading of EU, ASEAN and ASEM official 
documents) in order to shed light on continuity in the EU’s as well as on changes in the EU’s and 
ASEAN’s conduct, as this paper seeks to undertake, is not yet available. The present paper intends to 
contribute towards filling this gap.   
 
The three distinct phases in action  
 
How did the European Union interact with ASEAN regarding Myanmar? The policy of dialogue 
between the European Community (EC) and ASEAN (which established itself as a regional group in 
1967) developed due to trade and economic interests. Inter-regional relations were formalized in 1977, 
and the first official connections were based on the ASEAN-EC Cooperation Agreement of 1980. This 
agreement incorporated the areas of commerce, economy and development. The procedures for the EU 
ASEAN dialogue consisted of an annual meeting of foreign ministers, and additional special meetings 
as required.
60
  
 
Different approaches  
 
The two regional groups adopted distinct approaches to Myanmar. More generally, the European Union 
was inclined to enhance its ‘global role’ and extend its influence to Asia and Southeast Asia. With the 
entering into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, and with the changes that this introduced in 
institutional and political terms, the EU embraced an ‘all-inclusive policy’ that was used in external 
relations, incorporating a variety of issues. This comprehensive policy particularly focused on the 
consolidation of democracy, sustainable development and good governance. The beliefs in freedom 
from fear, respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, freedom from want, and 
social wellbeing in all of its aspects
61
 lay at the basis of the ‘good governance’ of the European Union. 
These values would later, in 2003, be included in the European Security Strategy.
62
 The EU’s 
interpretation of ‘global security’ respected the principle that all states needed sufficient access to the 
above ‘goods’.63 This approach was to apply also to Myanmar.64  
 
For ASEAN, the compliance with the non-interference norm to its members’ conduct of internal affairs 
was one of the principles it held, as a signatory of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). 
The ASEAN members placed great emphasis on the belief in ‘mutual respect for independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity and national identity’.65 They declared loyalty to the principles of 
the United Nations Charter,
66
 and adherence to ‘justice and the rule of law’ as ideals to defend when 
                                                 
57 Haacke, J. (2007) ‘The Political-Security Imperative and Foreign Policy Goals’, The Adelphi Papers 46:381, 13-
24.   
58 Haacke, J. (2008) ‘ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative?’ Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol. 30, No. 3: 351-378.   
59 Haacke, J. (2005) ‘”Enhanced Interaction” with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN 
Refining or Breaking with its Diplomatic and Security Culture?’ Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 27, No. 2: 
188-216.    
60 Brettner-Messler (2012) op. cit., 143.   
61 Rotberg, R. I. (2004) ‘Strengthening Governance: Ranking Countries Would Help’, The Washington Quarterly, 
Vol. 28, pp. 71-81.   
62 ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy’, Brussels 12 December 2003. Available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf 
63 Biscop, S. (2006) ‘From Reflections to Power: Implementing the European Security Strategy’, in Hauser, G. and 
Kernic, F. (eds), European Security in Transition, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 87-102.   
64 See: Wiessala, G. (2006) Re-orienting the Fundamentals: Human Rights and New Connections in EU-Asia 
Relations, Burlington, Ashgate.    
65 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, 1976. Available at: http://www.asean.org/1217.htm 
66 United Nations, 1945. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml   
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they undersigned the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, constitutive of their group.
67
 ASEAN had not 
interpreted the political repression in Myanmar as an issue of democratic rights, as had the EU. 
Repression was an internal problem that, eventually, could be dealt with bilaterally.
68
 ASEAN 
developed a ‘quiet’ and informal style of diplomacy to Myanmar that showed respect, tolerance for 
diversity and a commitment to non-criticism of the junta.
69
  
 
The European Union engaged in a sanction strategy through its own channel of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) (which was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and reinforced by the 
Amsterdam and Nice Treaties in 1999 and 2001).
70
 The EU sanctions are understood here as measures 
taken in reply to Myanmar’s junta behaviour, which the EU maintained was contrary to the 
international law.
71
 They are considered part of the bargaining process, stressing that the ability to 
reciprocate concessions made by the targeted state was essential for success. They are not intended to 
be repressive or punitive but, rather, coercive measures.
72
 The CFSP common positions were supported 
by the unanimity requirement of the Council. The CFSP provisions were supervised by the Council, 
which regularly reported to the Presidency and the European Commission, in order to review the 
decisions adopted in the light of new developments in Myanmar. When needed, further measures were 
deliberated and in the case of improvements, the suspension
73
 of particular restrictions was considered 
as well as the gradual resumption of cooperation.
74
 These developments however occurred over a long 
period and in fact the sanctions against Myanmar were renewed over several years.
75
   
 
ASEAN’s line of opposition to the discourse of the EU on good governance (and democratic issues) 
grew steadily. Paradoxically the balance of preferences within the Asian group was inclined to favour 
states which were governed by authoritarian regimes. The latter were keen to exclude attempts to enter 
into an intra-regional debate on governance and humanitarian themes. Yet there were exceptions, such 
as ASEAN states developing national, liberal-democratic, political frameworks (Philippines and 
Thailand), and non-state actors engaged in different fields of social activism. Notwithstanding this 
intra-regional debate’s fragmentation, the rejection of the ‘external other’76 was the common pattern 
uniting both the supporters of democracy and authoritarianism. In its relations with the EU concerning 
Myanmar, the Association defended its opposition to ‘external interferences’ (and to the good 
governance line). Hence, as the EU insisted on sanctions, ASEAN rejected censure of the regime by its 
EU dialogue partner, as it has been observed throughout the 1991-1997 period. Later, in the 1998-2006 
period, the EU moderated its criticism of Myanmar, while the Association appeared to distance itself 
from rejecting censure of the regime by its EU dialogue, and subsequently, throughout the 2007-2012 
period, the EU employed targeted sanctions and limited development cooperation, while ASEAN 
encouraged better governance. The respective developments characterising these three phases will now 
be explored.   
 
1991-1997: The EU insists on sanctions, and ASEAN rejects the censure of the regime by 
its EU dialogue partner  
 
                                                 
67 ASEAN Declaration, Bangkok, 8 August 1967. Available at: 
http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Transnational/bangdec.pdf 
68 Manea (2009), op. cit., 35.  
69  See: Hughes (2007) op. cit., p. 321-2.  
70 With the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty (2010), the CFSP has become an integral part of the Common Security 
and Defence Policy.  
71 Taken by Combacau (1992, 313-4) in Portela (2010) op. cit. p. 19, 21, and adapted by the author to the European 
Union. Combacau, C. (1992) ‘Sanctions’, in Bernhardt, R. (ed) Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
Amsterdam, North-Holland.  
72 The EU’s sanction strategy aimed at inducing Myanmar’s junta to opt for better governance, building up a 
democratic system, representative of Burmese civil society, organised in full respect for people’s liberty and 
labourers’ rights.   
73 It was noted that ‘the conditions for the lifting or easing of sanctions are not spelled out as such, and are 
condensed in a broad formulation that allows the Council ample discretion to consider their lifting’ (Portela 2010, 
84).    
74 As reported in the Council Common Position (96/635/CFSP) of 28 October 1996.  
75 Intensification of sanctions is documented by Portela (2010) and Manea (2009), and ASEAN states’ attitude to 
sanctions is documented by Haacke (2010). 
76 Manea (2009), op. cit., 35, 45.  
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The European Union’s pressure for change on the military regime built up in the aftermath of the 
junta’s violent response to the Burmese pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988. However, the EU 
acted officially and collectively only in 1991, with sanctions prompted by the junta’s failure to 
recognise the results of the May 1990 elections. These earned Suu Kyi’s National League for 
Democracy 59 per cent of the votes, and would have guaranteed 80 per cent of the parliament seats. 
Suu Kyi was under house arrest since 1989. According to the Council, the EU was disappointed at the 
unwillingness of Slorc, the military junta, to enter into a meaningful dialogue with it, and reaffirmed its 
determination to resume such dialogue at some point in the future. The Council agreed to the 
suspension of development aid (excluding humanitarian aid programmes) and on the establishment of 
diplomatic sanctions (see note).
77
 Sanctions embargoed weapons and their ammunition and the 
maintenance and transfer of military technology. At the meetings with ASEAN, the EU ‘expressed its 
overall interest in democracy (and human rights’), raising the irritation of the Association’s members 
(in Kuala Lumpur in 1990, Luxemburg in 1991, and Manila in 1992),
78
 while ASEAN maintained its 
critical stance towards the European Union when communicating with it. However, in 1994, the 
Foreign Ministers of the two regional groups agreed on a joint Declaration in Karlsruhe within which 
they ‘expressed the hope that ASEAN’s policy of constructive engagement and the EU’s willingness to 
engage in a critical dialogue will eventually contribute to achieving more sustainable improvements in 
all fields’ (paragraph 34).79 This declaration was based on the two different positions: the Association’s 
non-commitment towards criticising Myanmar and the EU’s resolution to induce the junta to engage in 
a systematic negotiation on good governance. ASEAN’s policy of constructive engagement indicated 
‘a mix of moderate diplomacy and greater economic interaction’ which was respectful of the non-
interference ideology.
80
 The Commission’s Communication of 1994, ‘Towards a New Asia Strategy’, 
began with the statement that the ‘rise of Asia [was] dramatically changing the world balance of 
economic power’ (p. 1).81 As a strategy, the EU aimed to remain included in the Southeast Asian 
region. The controversy over Myanmar was in some way watered down, as it arose in Karlsruhe, and 
relations tended to focus on economic ties.
82
   
 
The 1996 Council’s request for the unconditional release of political prisoners was motivated by the 
junta’s further repressive behaviour.83 The EU insisted that the NLD, and other legitimate political 
parties from ethnic minorities, should be permitted to conduct their activities. The Council introduced 
additional sanctions,
84
 renewable after six months, and reaffirmed those that had been previously 
adopted. With the EU’s policy in Southeast Asia focusing on respect for democratic principles and 
associated themes (which ‘together form[ed] a major objective of the external policy of the European 
Union’ – p. 12),85 Myanmar increasingly became the centre of attention of EU-ASEAN affairs. No 
intrusion within the member states’ domestic matters, no emphasis on global freedom, less 
institutionalization and the prominence of voluntarism vis-à-vis cooperation remained the dominating 
                                                 
77 The diplomatic sanctions involved the ‘expulsion of all military personnel attached to the diplomatic 
representations’ of Myanmar in the EU capitals, the ‘withdrawal of all military personnel attached to diplomatic 
representations’ of the EU member states in Myanmar, the suspension of high-level bilateral governmental visits to 
Myanmar, including those by ministers and officials at the level of political directors, and above. Council of the 
European Union (1991) ‘Statement by the Presidency of the Council of the European Union concerning 
Burma/Myanmar’, Press 91/238, 29 July 1991. 
78 Manea (2013) op. cit., 321. 
79 Joint Declaration at the 11th EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 23 September 1994, Karlsruhe.   
80 Haacke (2007) ‘Myanmar and ASEAN’, op. cit., 42.   
81 Communication of the Commission to the Council, COM(94)314, Brussels, 13 July 1994, op. cit. 
82 See: Robles, C. A. (2004) The Political Economy of Interregional Relations: ASEAN and the EU, Aldershot, 
Ashgate, 143. ASEAN and EU’s interactions grew when the two engaged in discussions on political matters at the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which was launched in 1993. ARF was the only inter-governmental structure 
aimed at promoting peace and security through dialogue and cooperation in Asia-Pacific.     
83 The named practices were ‘torture, executions, forced labour and displacement of the population, restrictions on 
the fundamental rights of freedom of speech, movement and assembly’. Council of the European Union, Council 
Common Position (96/635/CFSP) of 28 October 1996 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the 
Treaty on European Union, on Burma/Myanmar. 
84 The Council vetoed entry visa for senior members of the Slorc and their families, and senior members of the 
military or the security forces – and their families – who formulated, implemented or benefitted from policies that 
impeded Myanmar’s transition to democracy. It suspended high-level bilateral governmental visits to Myanmar. 
These involved Ministers and Officials at the level of political director and above. Council of the European Union, 
Council Common Position (96/635/CFSP), of 28 October 1996, defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 
of the Treaty on European Union, on Burma/Myanmar.  
85 Communication of the Commission to the Council, COM(94)314, Brussels, 13 July 1994, op. cit. 
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features separating the ASEAN from the EU in their respective attitudes to Myanmar (as well as to 
regional integration). The argument of diversity of vision took broader shape that same year, 1996, 
when the Association’s heads of state granted observer status to Myanmar within ASEAN.   
 
 
The 1997 crisis: Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN  
 
Specifically on the issue of incrementing sanctions on Myanmar, the Council agreed to investigate this 
matter in 1997
86
 when the Association’s Heads of State, contrary to the EU’s resistance, accorded full 
ASEAN membership to Myanmar. The Association’s enlargement87 led its respective new members to 
join the 1980 EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement. By contrast, Myanmar ‘was excluded … because 
of its lack of democracy and its poor human rights record’.88 The EU-ASEAN meetings were cancelled 
in winter 1997. Yet, a high level EU-ASEAN ministerial summit had been postponed for over two 
years, since the EU member states refused to convene with Burmese representatives. The EU’s 
sanctions mostly concerned the industrial and agricultural areas as a response to the use of forced 
labour. Acting on a proposal by the Commission, Council Regulation EC552/97 of 24 March 1997 
penalised Myanmar in accordance with International Labour Organisation Conventions Nos. 29 and 
105. The measures involved the withdrawal of Myanmar’s access to the system of generalized tariff 
preferences, previously granted by EC Regulations of 1994 and 1996.
89
 The Council declared that, 
having discussed the implications of Myanmar’s admittance to ASEAN, it expected such a membership 
to contribute to the promotion of democratic principles.
90
 It protracted its previous sanctions for further 
six months. The European Union had some difficulty in coping with Myanmar’s accession. The EU 
was a human rights advocate, as well as accountable to the national parliaments and the European 
Parliament, and, furthermore, it was constrained by the unanimity principle on which EU’s foreign 
policy formulation was based. ASEAN had no strict criteria for membership and had ‘never made it 
conditional to political reform’.91 With the Association’s inclusion of Myanmar together with Laos, and 
previously (in 1995) of Vietnam, ASEAN was becoming more representative of the region. The 
European Union had more reasons than ever to confirm its intention ‘to raise the profile of Europe’ in 
Southeast Asia (p. 4),
92
 and was even inclined to take a pragmatic course,
93
 putting aside sensitive 
issues.  
 
Continuing the dialogue?  
 
During the EU-ASEAN political crisis, Singapore’s Prime Minister (Goh Chok Tong) proposed, in 
1996, the Asia-Europe Meeting.
94
 ASEM was judged a chiefly original proposition to resume the 
dialogue for at least three reasons. First, ASEM (which included 15 EU member states, the European 
Commission’s President and the ASEAN members) had the advantage of accepting also China, Japan 
and South Korea, and allowed for the incorporation of India and Pakistan. Second, the participating 
states were to meet bi-annually. This configured a looser structure than the procedures for the EU 
ASEAN dialogue. ASEM biennial summits were attended by the Heads of State and Government and 
other officials, in addition to the President of the European Commission. In the years in-between the 
summits, foreign ministers held their meetings. The political pillar of ASEM (the others being 
economic, social, cultural and educational) encompassed security policy (international crisis, security, 
multilateralism, regional developments, terrorism, arm proliferation, migration and human rights). The 
novelty of ASEM’s role lay also in its capacity to offer a forum also for the presentation of viewpoints, 
perspectives and intentions, as a kind of preparation for the later discussions at the appropriate 
                                                 
86 2019th Council Meeting – General Affairs - Luxembourg, 26 June 1997.  
87 Enlargement included Vietnam in 1995 and Cambodia and Laos in 1997.  
88 Fact Sheets on the European Union, 2012, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_6.4.12.pdf 
89 Council Regulation of 24 March 1997, (EC552/97). 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31997R0552:EN:HTML 
90  2019th Council Meeting – General Affairs - Luxembourg, 26 June 1997, op. cit.  
91 From ASEAN’s viewpoint, Myanmar’s accession had a main justification into balancing its dependency upon 
China. Haacke (2007, 58) ‘Myanmar and ASEAN’, op. cit.; Blankert, J. W. (2012) ‘ASEAN and the EU: Natural 
Partners’ in Novotny et al (eds) op. cit., 139-154, 149. Nuttin, X. (2012) ‘EU-ASEAN Relations in the 21st 
Century: In search for Common Values to Forge a Parnership’, in Novotny et al (eds) (2012) op. cit, 166-178, 175.   
92 Communication of the Commission to the Council, COM(94)314, Brussels, 13 July 1994, op. cit. 
93 Yeo, L. H. (2007) ‘The Inter-regional Dimension of EU-Asia Relations: EU-ASEAN and the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) Process’, European Studies Vol. 25: 173-191, 180. 
94 ASEM was conceived by Singapore and France in 1994.  
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summits.
95
 Third, the process was very informal. The instruments for implementing the collective 
agreements were the (economic and political) protocols. Protocols implied simple procedures if 
compared to the Cooperation Agreements which needed the European Parliament’s authorisation. For 
the European Union, ASEM constituted a new structure and a new approach. Few choices were 
available to the EU in its attempt to continue the dialogue with the Southeast Asian states, and the 
Union welcomed the ASEM process.
96
 Yet, the EU’s persistence to coerce on Myanmar was expressed 
in the Council’s declaration that its membership of ASEAN did ‘not automatically imply membership 
of ASEM’.97 This position created further controversy, and Myanmar had to wait until 2004 for a 
solution. At the first meetings of Foreign Ministers in the ASEM framework (ASEM1 in Bangkok on 
1-2 March 1996, and ASEM2 in London on 3-4 April 1998), in Bangkok, the Chairman’s Conclusive 
Statement laid emphasis on some general issues (‘cooperation in the field of human resources 
development’ was an important component of Asia-Europe ties) and, in London, the Chairman’s 
declaration included a seminar on labour relations among the new initiatives to be taken in that year.
98
 
Rejecting censure of Myanmar’s regime from its EU dialogue partner, in none of ASEM’s conclusive 
official documents did ASEAN make explicit reference to Myanmar or to the situation there.  
 
Burmese perceptions on sanctions and beyond 
 
What are the perceptions of the European Union and its policy among the people in Myanmar? 
Burmese perspectives on the EU and its action are hard to qualify. Some among civil society in recent 
interviews have stated that they have no idea what the European Union is, while others preferred to 
ignore it, taking the view that the Burmese people have not been helped but penalised. Myanmar’s 
development has been curbed: ‘how could we have a positive conception of the EU?’ If there was an 
idea of restraining the junta from acquiring arms, time had been lost due to the embargo because the 
SLORC/SPDC had obtained weapons through Singapore, China and Russia, to mention only a few 
providers.
99
 A ‘well-informed’ Burmese citizen dismissed sanctions. The military in power turned the 
circumstance of being countered by external forces to its advantage. Domestically, the junta defied the 
situation, and strengthened the significance of the principle of non-interference in Myanmar’s affairs, 
reinforcing the argument that Myanmar’s sovereignty was a value to be respected.100 A similar 
judgment concerning sanctions upheld that the SPDC was disturbed, but not to the extent intended by 
the sanctions. ‘Restrictive actions’ built up the junta’s attention to privilege its neighbourhood, and at 
the same time secured its protection within the region.
101
 On the extent of the preoccupation with the 
economic restraint, some responses indicated that it was true that poverty had increased nationwide and 
that the local industries had been weakened. There was no alternative but to accept this and, anyway, 
people knew that the country was rich in natural resources. The extraction sector was trading well, 
particularly through Thailand. These resources would have been further exploited in future and people 
believed that a better future existed.
102
 Others insisted that the hardship (i.e. sanctions) created by the 
EU for the junta had no support in the region. At times, there had been (political) adversity to 
overcome with certain states, but some other countries were very supportive and helped to maintain 
balanced relations. The junta also operated in the region’s interest (i.e. ASEAN), not over-reacting to 
criticism when this occurred. The SPDC has understood that the neighbouring countries were under 
intense international pressure, which was negatively affecting their project of deepening integration.
103
 
Not everybody in Myanmar supported Su Kyi. There was some indifference if not opposition against 
the NLD’s leader. One of the areas where such attitudes were unveiled was the region around Pathein 
in Mon State, which has been severely hit by Cyclone Nargis, in May 2008, during which 140,000 
died.
104
 With regard to Myanmar’s unexpected turn to the West, the interviews with Burmese people 
and ASEAN leaders suggested that it was not the constrictions imposed by the Union (and by other 
international actors) but rather the reality of the hatred for China within Myanmar that proved the 
driving force. China exploited many natural resources and abused the conditions of poverty and 
                                                 
95 Brettner-Messler (2012) op. cit., 145. See ASEM InfoBoard, Overview, Main Pillars, ASEM Ministerial 
Meetings. Available at: http://www.aseminfoboard.org  
96 Forster (1999), op. cit., 752-754; Cameron (2013), op. cit., 37.  
97 2019th Council Meeting – General Affairs - Luxembourg, 26 June 1997, op. cit.  
98 http://www.aseminfoboard.org/summit-statement.html 
99 Interview with a Burmese academic, Yangon, January 2013.   
100  Interviews with members of civil society, Myanmar Book Centre, Yangon, January 2013.  
101 Interview with a South Korean diplomat, Yangon, January 2013.  
102 Interview with an officer of a governmental agency, Nyaungshwe, Shan State, January 2013.   
103 Interview with an academic, Myanmar Book Centre, Yangon, January 2013.   
104 Interview with a member of the NLD near Pathein in Mon State, January 2013.  
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underdevelopment. Irritation at the encroaching role played by China in Myanmar and the desirability 
of new partners contributed to make the impetus for change and reform.
105
   
 
 
EU behaviour and statements 
 
What does the observation of EU behaviour within the EU-ASEAN interaction convey with regard to 
Myanmar? During its 1997 breakpoint with ASEAN over the Burmese accession, the European Union 
issued a declaration intended to soothe the crisis: ‘The EU looks forward to continued close 
cooperation between our two respective regions [and] … would like … to re-affirm its commitment to 
the EU-ASEAN dialogue’.106 Again, in that same year after firmly countering Yangon’s association, 
the EU not only accepted it, but also stated that ‘the Council agreed that the opportunity of the EU-
ASEAN dialogue should be used to discuss the situation in Burma/Myanmar’ (p. 8).107 Hence the 
Council laid emphasis on the welcoming occasion to reinforce the dialogue with the Southeast Asian 
countries via this new commitment regarding Myanmar. This is a new position describing the EU-
ASEAN relationship vis-à-vis Myanmar. More evidence emerged due to the EU’s attitude to the Asia-
Europe Meeting’s new framework of resuming the dead consultations. In a Commission’s document, in 
2001, the appeal of ASEM was put into focus: ‘The value of the ASEM process will be further 
enhanced through a broader participation’.108 The EU appears keen to avoid that the Myanmar issue 
destabilise its relations with ASEAN. 
 
1998-2006: The EU moderates criticism of Myanmar, and ASEAN distances itself from 
rejecting censure of the regime by its EU dialogue  
 
In the aftermath of the problems arising from the 1997 dialogue, a combination of external influences 
and domestic dynamics contributed towards changing both the EU and ASEAN’s attitude towards 
Myanmar. Firstly, as early as 1994, the EU had expressed an intention to strengthen the Union’s ties 
with ASEAN (p. 4), an objective that remained valid. It had decided ‘to accord Asia a higher priority 
than [was] at present the case’ (p. 4). An important component of the EU’s position was the pursuit of 
‘new proactive strategies towards Asia’ (p. 17), and this combined well with its perceived need ‘to 
maintain its leading role in world economy’ (p. 4).109 These aspects reconfirmed the EU’s positive 
stance on ASEAN, and militated against a rigid approach to Myanmar within the Association. The new 
position resulted in the Council attempting to start using the suspension of sanctions (April 2003), 
rather than the sanctions themselves, as a way to obtain compliance,
110
 developing a two-pronged 
strategy by employing positive and negative actions. Secondly, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 
led ASEAN members to question the ability of their group to provide a solution to several problems, 
throwing the Association’s collective identity in disarray.111 Indonesia, and particularly Thailand and 
the Philippines increasingly criticised ASEAN’s practice of refraining from interference, and called for 
a policy of ‘flexible engagement’. The latter intended to allow ASEAN to address the regional crisis 
caused by the domestic situation. The de-legitimisation of the argument of ‘good government without 
democracy’, which was central to ASEAN’s policy, contributed to the fall of the Suharto regime in 
Indonesia in 1998 and also to its democratisation. These developments forced a revision of the non-
interference dogma,
112
 and also restructured the field of the human rights discourse among ASEAN 
countries. Hence, democratic and humanitarian issues’ interactions became possible also between 
ASEAN and the EU. The Association’s reaction to the consequences of the economic crisis supported a 
new input on integration (ASEAN vision 2020 issued in 1997, Hanoi Plan of Action in 1998). Thirdly, 
                                                 
105 Interviews with Burmese people, British Council, Yangon centre, January 2013, and with ASEAN leaders, 
Macau, May 2013.  
106  ‘Declaration by the European Union on the accession of Cambodia, Laos and Burma/Myanmar to ASEAN’, 
Luxembourg, 2 June 1997, 8637/97 (Presse 189) E/59/97.   
107 2019th Council Meeting – General Affairs - Luxembourg, 26 June 1997, op. cit.  
108 Commission Communication on ‘Europe and Asia:  A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships’ 
COM(2001) 469 final, Brussels 4 September 2001, op. cit. 
109 Communication of the Commission to the Council, COM(94)314, Brussels, 13 July 1994, op. cit. 
110 Portela (2010), op. cit., 82.  
111 Jetschke, A. (2013) ‘Regional Integration Support by the EU in Asia: Aims and Prospects’, in Christiansen et 
al., op. cit., 226-243, 233.  Jetschke quotes Ruland, J. (2000) ‘ASEAN and the Asian Crisis: Theoretical 
Implications and Practical Consequences for Southeast Asian Regionalism’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No. 3: 
421-451.   
112 Though taking distance from the risk of diffuse pro-democracy changes in the region.  
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some understanding between the EU and ASEAN on Myanmar intended to induce the SPDC to temper 
its repressive behaviour towards the NLD and its followers, and accept the constitution of a EU Troika 
to assess improvements in the country in this regard.
113
 To balance this concession, the EU was to 
lessen its inflexible policy on the SPDC. All of these developments encouraged both the EU to tone 
down its criticism of Myanmar and ASEAN to distance itself from rejecting censure of the regime by 
its EU partner.
114
  
 
Also, in Myanmar, matters were evolving. In particular, from 2000-2002, the desire to improve 
relations with the wider international community prevailed, with a decision that was supported by the 
former prime minister (General Khin Nyunt) and his readiness to approach the political stalemate with 
the NLD and its general secretary.
115
   
 
Changes in action?  
 
Signs of the EU’s weakening criticism of Myanmar were provided by the opening of a Burmese 
diplomatic representation in Brussels around the year 2000, and by the Council introduction of several 
measures on democratisation assistance. At the same time, the Council reinstated sanctions.
116
 Also, 
ASEAN modified its language at ASEM3, held in Seoul in 2000,
117
 in the Chairman’s Statement 
(where ‘leaders committed themselves to promote and protect all human rights, including the right to 
development, and fundamental freedoms, bearing in mind their universal, indivisible and 
interdependent character
118
 as expressed at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna’ 
(paragraph 8)). Myanmar was not cited, but problems similar to those in Myanmar were mentioned. 
Again, no particular indication concerning that country was given by ASEAN in ASEM4’s conclusive 
Chairman’s Statement in 2002.119 The following EU’s policy consistent with the new strategy of two-
level (positive and negative) action, developed in 2003; before that date, the EU extended its penalising 
measures.
120
 In April 2003, the EU tried to suspend sanctions
121
 until October 2003, and pledged to 
refrain from re-imposing the measures if ‘substantive progress towards national reconciliation, 
[together with] the restoration of democratic order’ had been made by then.122 Shortly afterwards, a 
new confrontation (the Depayin incident) played against the EU’s opening, and the Council negated the 
suspension before the announced deadline.
123
  
 
Confirming the changes: The Depayin incident and beyond  
 
An attitudinal change among the Association towards the military junta was induced by the events of 
30 May 2003 (attack on the supporters of the opposition leader and Suu Kyi’s reinstated house arrest). 
The Association was now openly speaking out about transition in Myanmar in the Joint Communiqué 
of ASEAN ministers of June 2003, delivered in Phnom Pen (see note).
124
 ‘Democracy’ was a new word 
                                                 
113 deFlers (2010), op. cit., 6. Jones, L. (2008) ‘ASEAN’s Albatross: ASEAN’s Burma Policy, from Constructive 
Engagement to Critical Disengagement’, Asian Security Vol. 4, No. 3: 271-293, 277.  
114 Manea (2008) op. cit., 386, 391; (2009) op. cit., 39.    
115 During that short period, the junta exhibited more cooperative behaviour as in relations with non-state actors, 
such as allowing the International Committee of the Red Cross as well as Amnesty International to visit detainees. 
Haacke (2007) ‘Introduction’, op. cit., 10.  
116 The EU expanded visa bans, and imposed a freezing of assets on the blacklisted individuals. Council of the 
European Union, Council Common Position (2000/346/CFSP) of 26 April 2000.       
117 Third ASEM meeting in Seoul on 20-21 October 2000.  
118 These concepts (which were included in the Vienna Declaration of 25 June 1993) were going to influence 
ASEAN’s international action, its regional policy in Southeast Asia and interaction among its members.  
119 Fourth Asia-Europe Meeting in Copenhagen on 23-24 September 2002.  
120 The EU reconfirmed sanctions and prolonged the list of bans and of disciplined individuals in: Council of the 
European Union, Council Common Position (2001/757/CFSP) of 29 October 2001, and Council of the European 
Union, Council Common Position (2002/831/CFSP) of 21 October 2002.   
121 Sanctions were visa ban, asset freeze, and prohibition of technical training and assistance. 
122 Council of the European Union, Council Common Position (2003/297/CFSP) on Burma/Myanmar, 28 April 
2003.  
123 Council of the European Union, Council Common Position (2003/345/CFSP) of 20 June 2003.  
124 ‘We discussed the recent political developments in Myanmar, particularly the incident of 30 May 2003. (…) we 
urged Myanmar to resume its efforts of national reconciliation and dialogue among all parties concerned leading to 
a peaceful transition to democracy. We welcomed the assurances given by Myanmar that the measures taken 
following the incident were temporary and looked forward to the early lifting of restrictions placed on Daw Aung 
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which entered the Association’s official documents. The junta’s domestic conduct and particularly the 
treatment of Suu Kyi now became an ‘issue’ in ASEAN’s relations with Myanmar. The SPDC 
antagonised several ASEAN member states either because they were trying to sharpen the new 
democratic credentials, because they were distracted from deepening integration, or due to the 
increasing external pressure upon them regarding Myanmar’s observance of the international demands. 
The attitudinal change was confirmed by ASEAN’s members, notably by Malaysia’s Prime Minister (a 
‘staunch opponent of pressure on humanitarian issues’), who argued that Myanmar should be expelled 
from ASEAN if it ‘did not release Suu Kyi and another 1,400 political prisoners’.125 Very distinctively, 
the Thai Prime Minister ‘offered to mediate’ between the junta and the broader regional and 
international community, and discuss a ‘roadmap toward democracy’ by bringing together all of the 
countries concerned.
126
 Also, the media reacted to the incidents (by calling on ‘every ASEAN leader to 
send a strong individual message to Yangon’),127 as well as advocacy groups and the ASEAN Inter-
Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus (AIPMC, that started to work publicly in 2004), which spoke out 
strongly against Myanmar.
128
  
 
Observing ASEAN behaviour  
 
The principle of ‘performance legitimacy’ was thoroughly reconsidered by ASEAN leaders in the Bali 
declaration (Concord II) of October 2003,
129
 and soon afterwards in the ASEM5 Chairman’s Statement 
in Hanoi of October 2004, where they made recommendations to the SPDC.130 The Hanoi (ASEM5) 
2004 statement was the most complete declaration that ASEAN issued regarding expectations related 
to Myanmar.
131
 The precursor to this shift has been noticed in 2000 (in Seoul, with the insertion of the 
‘right to development and fundamental freedom’ issue in the intra-regional discourse as well as in the 
wider discourse with the ASEM partners), and subsequently became more visible in 2003 (in the 
Phnom Pen Joint Communiqué asking Myanmar to open up a dialogue leading to a ‘peaceful transition 
to democracy’), and took an even more important turn in 2004 (in Hanoi, by suggesting measures that 
Myanmar should follow). ASEAN’s principle of non-interference in its members’ affairs was relatively 
relaxed at that point (or, as Haacke put it, it qualified as ‘enhanced interaction’, explaining it as a public 
articulation of ASEAN’s shared concerns).132 The substance of the Hanoi message was new, with all 
stakeholders engaged in Myanmar being invited to join forces to guarantee positive consequences for 
reconciliation. It gave weight to the NDL, its leader and to other movements which opposed the junta, 
and indicated that there were forums to be freed up for a ‘genuine debate’. These positions were 
strengthened by the emphasis on the SPDC needing to ‘lift restrictions’ on persons and parties, ‘in 
accordance with the assurances’ previously given. 
 
Not so ‘moderated’ and not so ‘accommodating’: Myanmar’s accession to ASEM in 2004  
 
The EU’s obstinacy to sanction Yangon and ASEAN’s un-accommodating of the EU position 
reresurfaced. Together with expressing concern about the SPDC, the 2004 Hanoi (ASEM5) Statement 
                                                                                                                                            
San Suu Kyi and the NLD members’. ASEAN ministers Joint Communique  ́at their 36th Ministerial Meeting in 
Phnom Pen, on 17 June 2003.    
125 Myanmar (Burma):Year In Review 2003. Available at: 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/916894/Myanmar-Burma-Year-In-Review-2003 
126 Haacke (2007) ‘Myanmar and ASEAN’, op. cit., 52.  
127 Lim Kit Siang, from the Malaysian Democratic Action Party. Available at: http://dapmalaysia.org/all-
archive/English/2003/sep03/lks/lks2650.htm  
128 AIPMC was constituted by regional lawmakers, from both ruling and non-ruling political parties across 
Southeast Asia, working towards peace in Myanmar. Available at:  
http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/burma/peacebuilding-organisations/aipmc/ 
129 ‘The ASEAN Security Community is envisaged to … ensure that countries in the region live … in a just, 
democratic and harmonious environment’ (p. 3). Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, in Bali on 7 October 2003, 
www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Transnational/2003Declaration.pdf    See also Hughes (2007), op. cit., 322.  
130 The leaders ‘encouraged all stakeholders in [Myanmar] to work together to ensure a successful outcome of the 
ongoing national reconciliation process. The National Convention should be an important element in the national 
reconciliation and democratization process and a forum for a genuine open debate with the participation of all 
political groups in the country’. Fifth Asia-Europe-Meeting Chairman’s Statement, Hanoi, 7-9 October 2004. 
Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/asem/asem5/index.html   
131 ASEM in its Tenth Year’, European Background Study, University of Helsinki, 2006, op. cit. 
132 Haacke (2007) ‘Myanmar and ASEAN’, op. cit., 43. There has been an intense debate on ‘when’ and ‘whether’ 
the non-interference principle has been abandoned. Lee Jones (2008) argued that ASEAN’s policy on Myanmar 
has never been one of strict non-interference.  
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‘warmly welcomed the Union of Myanmar’ at the Asia-Europe Meeting (p. 10). This situation 
complicated EU-ASEAN relations. The EU’s opposition to incorporate Myanmar into ASEM was 
expressed in the 2003 Commission Communication.
133
 Diplomatic crises followed, when several 
ASEAN ministers refused to participate in summits from which Myanmar had been banned by the EU, 
and two meetings of ASEM finance ministers were cancelled.
134
 On ASEAN’s side, there had been 
preparatory talks on its admittance prior to the Hanoi summit. The Indonesian Foreign Minister 
(Hassan Wirajuda) pretended to instruct that no political conditions had to be attached, and that he 
would have blamed the EU if the ASEM process collapsed over Myanmar. The Cambodia Prime 
Minister (Hun Sen) affirmed that his country would not have joined ASEM without the other two new 
ASEAN members (Laos and Myanmar) being accepted at the same time. Before the Hanoi summit, in 
August 2004, Myanmar’s Prime Minister (General Khin Nyunt) met Vietnam’s Prime Minister (Phan 
Van Khai) to discuss Yangon’s participation. The meeting was attended by Hanoi-based ambassadors 
and ASEAN members’ diplomats, all demonstrating the extent of ASEAN’s great solidarity.135 On the 
EU side, the Council conceded the presence of Myanmar’s representatives ‘where a political dialogue 
[was] conducted that directly promote[d] … the rule of law in Burma/Myanmar’ (Paragraph 5, Art. 5). 
At the same time, it expanded the sanctions (see note).
136
 Why were ASEAN members tolerating such a 
pariah state to the point of offering inclusion at the Asia-Europe Meeting after the uneasiness about 
Yangon had been demonstrated during the Depayin repression? It seems a paradox, although several 
reasons supported that decision, primarily ASEAN’s determination to build a completely inclusive 
Southeast Asian community. ASEM was an emanation of the Association and was seen as 
consolidating its existence. Secondly, there was ‘the conviction that China’s rise could positively shape 
East Asia only if successful counterbalanced’137 and, thirdly, the preoccupation that Myanmar could 
definitely turn to China as an alternative source of support. Myanmar was by now, 2004, firmly 
integrated into regional international society.
138
   
 
The limited ‘openness’ with regard to Myanmar 
 
Unfolding the two-pronged approach, the Council also promoted confidence-building measures aimed 
at giving strength to the opposition and actors at the local level, innovatively seeking to elude the 
involvement of governmental authorities.
139
 Its encouragement of positive measures was sustained by 
the European Commissioner’s (Ferrero-Waldner) announcement that the EU ‘would engage in a 
critical dialogue with the regime’. The dialogue was an attempt to press for reforms.140 The European 
limited ‘openness’ on Myanmar had not impeded the Council from opposing the prospect of the SPDC 
taking its turn as chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee in 2006-7. Adducing to the lack of ‘an 
inclusive democratization process’, the Council re-imposed sanctions and also proposed a partial 
suspension.
141
 ASEAN members similarly claimed that the ‘road map towards democracy’ (originally 
                                                 
133 ‘Both sides [the EU and ASEAN] will strive to avoid letting the question of the participation of 
Burma/Myanmar endanger the ASEM process itself’ [p. 13]). Commission of the European Communities, 
‘Communication from the Commission, A new partnership with South East Asia’, Brussels, 9.7.2003, 
COM(2003)399 final, op. cit.  
134 Smith, K. (2006) op. cit., 165.  
135 The Vietnam News, 9 August 2004. Fitriani (2013) op. cit., 5-8.    
136 Sanctioning included the suspension of non-humanitarian aid, embargo on arms and military equipment; visa 
ban and freezing of assets of members of the junta and high-ranking military officers and authorities in the tourism 
sector; investment and loan ban, including participation in state-owned enterprises; high-level bilateral 
governmental visits’ suspension; ban on the attachment of military personnel to the diplomatic representation of 
Myanmar in EU member states, and on the attachment of military personnel to diplomatic representations of the 
member states in Myanmar. An annex listed the individuals affected by the ban and assets freeze. Council of the 
European Union, Council Common Position 2004/423/CFSP of 26 April 2004 renewing restrictive measures 
against Burma/Myanmar, L 125/61.   
137 Counterbalanced by ASEAN increased integration. Manea (2013) op. cit., 326.  
138 Hughes (2007) op. cit., 323.  
139 The measures concerned non-humanitarian aid for projects defined in consultation with democratic groups, 
including the NLD and NGOs, and initiatives in support of democracy, poverty alleviation, health and basic 
education. Council of the European Union, Council Common Position 2004/423/CFSP of 26 April 2004 renewing 
restrictive measures against Burma/Myanmar, L 125/61, op. cit.  
140 Portela (2010) op. cit., 84-5. Kubosova, L. (2005) ‘The EU shifts its strategy towards Burma’, 
EUObserver.com, 1 February 2005.  
141 Council of the European Union, Council Common Position (2005/340/CFSP) of 25 April 2005 and Council 
Common Position (2006/318/CFSP) concerning renewing restrictive measures against Burma/Myanmar, 27 April 
2006. Common Position (2006/318/CFSP) spells out that: ‘in the event of a substantial improvement in the overall 
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proposed by the Thai Prime Minister in 2003) made no visible progress, and opposed Myanmar’s 
chairmanship.
142
 The Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia also reacted individually, with 
the latter stressing that ‘democracy must be realised’ in Myanmar.143 The SPDC decided to act in the 
interest of ASEAN, which was under external pressure over Myanmar. It employed the justification 
that it wished to focus on the ‘ongoing national reconciliation and democratization process’,144 thus 
placing emphasis on Myanmar’s approach to exercise its own sovereign decision and contrast outside 
interactions, consistently with its constitution.
145
  
 
Departure from non-interference  
By now, the ASEAN members had been openly discussing the situation in Myanmar among 
themselves as well as with the European Union and their ASEM partners, as reflected in their official 
documents. They achieved an even greater change in attitude; they expressed the aspiration that 
Myanmar, as an ASEAN member, might attract the interest of other actors external to the region.
146
 
Their meetings highlighted their arguments.
147
 The SPDC’s non-compliance was barely defended.148 In 
particular Thailand’s Foreign Minister (Surin Pitsuwan) encouraged the move from the norm of non-
interference with internal affairs towards a policy of flexible engagement with Myanmar’.149 This 
called for growing interaction with the Burmese leaders, particularly when they took steps towards 
reform, and aimed to build people-to-people bridges.
150
 Reference to Myanmar in ASEAN and ASEM 
official documents progressively shifted from a staunch defence of the non-interference principle to 
mild pressure for reform. This change was largely due to the realization that Myanmar affected 
ASEAN’s international prestige and so, by extension, its integration project. The Association’s member 
states were now focused on transforming their group through the preparation of the ASEAN Charter, 
which was going to establish ASEAN as a legal entity, modelled on the European Union. Members of 
the Eminent Persons Group and the High Level Task Force in charge of drafting the Charter had 
contact with Brussels, and the EU provided assistance with the drafting. The Philippines declared that, 
were Myanmar not to restore democracy and free Suu Kyi, they would not ratify the Charter.
151
   
 
An analysis of EU behaviour  
 
Through both the 2001 and 2003 Commission’s Communications, the European Union declared its 
‘strategic’ intentions regarding Southeast Asia, and specifically of raising the EU’s political presence 
across that region to a level commensurate with the growing global weight of an enlarged EU. In 
reality, the EU’s political profile appeared less influential, at least in the terms enunciated by the 
Commission. Yet, some efforts were made to respond to the ‘key priority’ of further strengthening the 
long-standing partnership with ASEAN.
152
 Attempting the suspension of sanctions and compromising 
on Myanmar by opening up a diplomatic representation in Brussels were additionally aimed at 
revitalizing relations with ASEAN. This is a new feature characterizing the EU-ASEAN relationship 
with regard to Myanmar. Myanmar appears to offer occasions to the EU for re-invigorating its ties to 
                                                                                                                                            
political situation in Burma/Myanmar, the suspension of these restrictive measures and a gradual resumption of 
cooperation with Burma/Myanmar will be considered, after the Council has assessed developments’.   
142 ASEAN meeting of Foreign Ministers in Cebu, in the Philippines in April 2005.   
143 For instance, the National Convention draft of a new constitution excluded nine political parties representing 91 
per cent of parliamentary seats. Ibrahim, Z. (2005) ‘Turning the screws on Myanmar’, AIPMC (ASEAN Inter-
Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus), 28 December. http://www.aseanmp.org/?p=958  
144  Haacke (2007) ‘Myanmar and ASEAN’, op. cit.     
145 http://www.scribd.com/doc/7694880/Myanmar-Constitution-2008-English-version 
146 Joint Communiqué of the 39th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting of 25 July 2006, Kuala Lumpur.  
147 They looked forward to seeing ‘tangible progress that would lead to peaceful transition to democracy’. This 
implied the ‘release of those placed under detention’ in order to develop an ‘effective dialogue with all parties 
concerned’. Ibid. 
148 The Chairman’s Statement (ASEM6) called for a ‘transition via an inclusive process to a democratic 
government in line with the assurances given by Myanmar at the ASEM5 Summit’, in Hanoi in 2004. Sixth Asia-
Europe Meeting in Helsinki (ASEM6), on 10-11 September 2006.  
149 For a discussion on the transformation, see: Jones, L. (2008), op. cit., 275-7.  
150 ‘Thailand’s Surin Pitsuwan praised as term as ASEAN chief ends’ posted at The Royal Thai Embassy 
Washington DC, 7 January 2013. Available at: http://www.visetkaew.com/wp/2013/01/07/thailands-surin-
pitsuwan-praised-as-term-as-asean-chief-ends/  
151 Brettner-Messler (2012) op. cit., 146. deFlers (2010), op. cit., 6-7.  
152 Commission Communication on ‘Europe and Asia:  A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships’ 
COM(2001) 469 final, Brussels 4 September 2001, op. cit.  
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ASEAN. The consideration that ‘Southeast Asia was set to become one of the most dynamic growth 
areas in the world economy’ and that ‘closer relations were an economic imperative’153 contributed 
towards backing a more conciliatory policy on Myanmar via EU-ASEAN relations. The EU continued 
to be concerned that interaction with ASEAN with regard to Myanmar should not weaken its links with 
the Association.    
 
2007-2012: The EU employs targeted sanctions and limited development cooperation 
while ASEAN encourages better governance  
 
In 2007, the autumn pro-democracy demonstrations and repression (the Suffron uprising) laid bare 
ASEAN’s impatience with the military junta. ASEAN agreed a joint statement with the European 
Union.
154
 In the Council Conclusions of October 2007, the European Union warned the SPDC that a 
return to the situation as it was prior to the recent demonstrations was both unacceptable and 
unsustainable.
155
 Already by September, the EU Commissioner (Viviane Reding) had insisted with the 
European Parliament that Yangon’s ‘military regime was a threat to the people of Burma and the 
region’.156 The ASEAN-EU joint statement was non-binding and established no deadlines by which the 
SPDC must comply. Myanmar’s media, The Irrawaddy, argued that the junta’s strong man (General 
Than Shwe) knew ‘how to play in a sophisticated way with a weak organisation like ASEAN’.157 By 
contrast with ASEAN’s alleged low reputation, Singapore’s Foreign Minister (George Yeo) indicated 
that ‘ASEAN planned to use its moral authority to get all of the political parties in Burma to engage in 
a genuine dialogue’.158 Singapore held ASEAN’s chair and was in a position to seek to influence 
others’ views. It clarified ‘ASEAN’s role and stand’ on Myanmar.159 The ASEAN members were now 
striving ‘to prevent the Myanmar issue from obstructing’ their integration efforts (the ASEAN Charter 
and the establishment of the ASEAN Community). In a letter to Than Shwe, Singapore’s Prime 
Minister (Lee Hsien Loong) expressed the regional leaders’ concern.160 Myanmar’s Prime Minister, 
Thein Sein, replied that the Burmese situation was a ‘domestic affair’, reconfirming the junta’s 
traditional code of conduct. These matters were discussed at the 13
th
 ASEAN Summit, in Singapore, 
and were highlighted in the Chairman’s Statement (paragraph 16). The ASEAN member states also 
reacted individually to the Suffron incidents. Singapore’s senior minister (Goh Chok Tong) threatened 
to cease investment in Myanmar, regarding political reform as a precondition for their mutual 
economic interaction to continue.
161
 The Philippines’ Senate adopted a resolution urging the EU and 
ASEAN to end the SPDC’s repression of people.162 Also, the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar 
Caucus (AIPMC, through its President, Zaid Ibrahim) called for the expulsion of Myanmar from 
ASEAN.
163
 The European Union acknowledged the changes occurring in ASEAN’s attitudes, the 
condemnations of the junta’s conduct, and the Association’s efforts to influence the Burmese 
authorities to embrace the transition to democracy;
164
 the whole pointing at the novel stance of 
encouraging Myanmar’s better governance. The EU developed a strategy of targeted sanctions 
                                                 
153 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Communication from the Commission, A new partnership with 
South East Asia’, Brussels, 9.7.2003, COM(2003)399 final, op. cit.  
154 The statement urged Myanmar government to free all political prisoners. 
155 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Burma/Myanmar, 2824th General Affairs and External 
Relations Council Meeting, Luxemburg, 15-16 October 2007.  
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 17 
combined with a policy of a partial trade embargo and limited development cooperation.
165
  
 
EU’s targeted policy and development cooperation  
 
In the new combined policy, the Council increased its pressure on the SPDC (see note),
166
 and agreed 
on measures directed at state-owned industries and in particular at financial and technical assistance to 
enterprises.
167
 It also introduced a ban on the creation of joint ventures with blacklisted establishments, 
which included over 1,200 Burmese units.
168
 In parallel, the EU confirmed the continuation of the 
substantial humanitarian aid programmes.
169
 The European Commission (fully in line with the EU’s 
policy of 1996, strengthened and extended several times)
170
 released the Country Strategy Paper on 
Myanmar, in 2007, with an indicative budget of €65 million. The Strategy Paper provided the 
framework for EC assistance for the period 2007-2013. It resulted from the ‘European Consensus on 
Development’, agreed on 20 December 2005 between the European Commission, the European 
Parliament and the EU Council, which identified poverty reduction as the main priority of EC 
development assistance. The Strategy Paper concentrated on two focal sectors, education and health, 
and announced flanking actions in support of uprooted populations that were to be financed from 
relevant thematic programmes (p.3). One of the objectives of the policy of dialogue with Myanmar was 
‘strengthening civil society’ and intensifying ‘community participation’ in order to increase local non-
state actors’ contribution to the development process’ to take place in Myanmar (p.19).171 A former EU 
Special Envoy for Myanmar (2007-2011), interviewed by the author, expressed a positive judgement of 
the projects carried out by the Commission in 2007 ‘… because they engaged local people in collective 
activities, aiming at building trust and enhancing the interactions among communities …’.172 The EU 
also tried to promote negotiations on a EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA), in 2007, but these 
failed to materialise partially due to the political instability and related problems in Myanmar.
173
  
 
ASEAN (and the EU) encouraging better governance  
 
In 2007, ASEAN saw no progress in the SPDC’s governance, no dialogue with the political parties in 
Burma, neither political reforms nor a transition to democracy, all of which had been demanded at the 
Association’s summit in Singapore that year. In Beijing, in 2008, in the ASEM framework, ASEAN 
leaders encouraged the ‘government to engage all stakeholders in a inclusive political process in order 
to achieve national reconciliation and economic and social development’. They also requested the 
lifting of restrictions from the political parties and freeing those under detention (paragraph 12).
174
 This 
attitude of trying to convince the SPDC to embrace changes was developed further at the 14
th
 
ASEAN’s summit in Thailand (‘ASEAN Charter for Asian Peoples’) in February/March 2009. In the 
aftermath of the Depayin incidence in 2003, the junta embarked on a 7-step Roadmap to Democracy 
                                                 
165 Portela (2010) op. cit., 87. As the EU explains, ‘until 2004, the EU Common Position limited EC assistance to 
Burma/Myanmar to humanitarian aid. As the restrictive measures foreseen in the Common Position were never 
intended to hurt the population of the country, and in view of the deteriorating economic and social situation, the 
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more systematic approach to assistance in view to tackle the deep-rooted structural poverty in the country while 
continuing to invoke the government’s responsibility to attain the UN Millennium Development Goals (p. 20-1). 
The EC/Burma/Myanmar Strategy Paper (2007-2013), op. cit.     
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Burma/Myanmar, 2824th General Affairs and External Relations Council Meeting, Luxemburg, 15-16 October 
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168 Council of the European Union, Council Common Position 2007/750/CFSP of 19 November 2007 amending 
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171 The EC/Burma/Myanmar Strategy Paper (2007-2013), op. cit. 
172 Interview conducted in January 2013, in Turin, with a former EU Special Envoy for Myanmar from 2007 to 
2011.  
173 See deFlers (2010) op. cit., 7, note 20. Lim, P. (2012). ASEAN’s relations with the EU: obstacles and 
opportunities, European Union External Affairs Review, vol. 2 (1), pp. 46-58. Kristensen, S. B. (2013) ‘Myanmar 
in the EU-ASEAN Relationship’, Event Report, European Institute for Asian Studies, Brussels, 5 February.   
174 Chair’s Statement of the Seventh Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM7), Beijing, 24-25 October 2008.  
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(initially involving the reconvening of the National Convention). Already, by 2005, its failure to set a 
clear timetable for implementing the plan caused some erosion of the goodwill towards Myanmar in 
many Southeast Asian states.
175
 At the Thailand summit, ASEAN officials felt that they had to 
encourage the Burmese government to strengthen ‘national unity’ and contribute to ‘peace and 
prosperity’. A decisive call for the ‘participation of all political parties’ (paragraph 42)176 and for ‘free 
and fair’ general elections in 2010 respectively reinforced ASEAN’s and ASEM’s request for a shift in 
Myanmar’s conduct of domestic affairs.177 ASEAN and EU’s demand that the SPDC engage in 
promoting consensus was heightened in reaction to the court verdict passed on Suu Kyi, in August 
2009, which added 18 months to her house arrest. The Association leaders voiced their desire that, as 
an ASEAN member, Myanmar should behave in such a way as to be ‘well respected in the 
international community’.178 The ASEM partners prompted Myanmar’s authorities to step ‘towards a 
legitimate, constitutional and civilian system of government’ (Paragraph 73).179 The ASEAN argument 
that the elections must convince the international community that they were transparently prepared was 
a further reminder issued in late 2009 (paragraph 46).
180
 The European Union recommenced boosting 
its targeted policy in response to the court’s verdict on Suu Kyi, with sanctions this time focused on the 
members of the judiciary responsible for the decision.
181
 Successive Council’s positions, together with 
the extension of restrictive actions, also recognised the progress promised by the ‘promulgation of a 
new electoral law’.182  
 
Yet, faulty party registrations, defective laws and the boycott of the NLD regarding the November 
2010 elections were the specific focus of the meeting of ASEM Foreign Ministers held in Hungary in 
June 2011.
183
 The EU policy re-extended the sanctions
184
 and updated the list of persons and entities 
subject to restrictive procedures, in line with its focused strategy. It made clear to the Myanmar junta 
that the ‘non-association’ of the government’s appointees with the military was vital to the dialogue 
with the international community. Aiming at encouraging ‘progress in civilian governance’, the EU 
lifted for a period of twelve months the suspension of high-level bilateral governmental visits to 
Myanmar, and freed from these restrictions the new members of the government who were unaffiliated 
with the military. The reforms initiated by Thein Sein in his new role of President since March 2011 
and the subsequent April 2012 by-elections showed Myanmar’s willingness for change being put into 
practice. The transformations were publicly recognized by ASEAN and the European Union, which 
invited European companies to explore new opportunities for trade and investment and to promote the 
highest standards of integrity and Corporate Social Responsibility (OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, UN guiding principles and the EU’s own CSR strategy 2011-2014) (paragraph 7).185 The 
European Union solicited further compliance (paragraph 4)
186
 and renewed, and also lifted, certain 
                                                 
175 Haacke (2010) op. cit., 156, 160.  
176 Chairman’s Statement of the 14th ASEAN Summit ‘ASEAN Charter for Asian Peoples’, Cha-am Hua Hin, 
Thailand, 28 February–1 March 2009.  
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common ground’, and ‘advance mutual understanding’ and ‘friendship’ (paragraph 16). The dialogue also 
generated informal seminars on Human Rights, which have been held annually since 1998. Chair’s Statement, at 
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Council Meeting, Luxemburg, 23 April 2012, op. cit. 
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restrictive measures.
187
 Myanmar’s authorities’ signing on 20 September 2013, in Brussels, of the 
Additional Protocol on the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons was a further sign of a partnership in the making between the EU and 
Myanmar.
188
   
 
Assessing EU behaviour 
 
EU behaviour vis-à-vis Myanmar since the Suffron uprising evolved. EU ministers declared themselves 
ready to discuss Burmese matters with their Myanmar counterparts at several possible meetings 
(regional, ministerial ASEAN-EU, ASEM, or at bilateral gatherings at the margins of these). The EU 
delivered the Strategy Paper on Myanmar regarding 2007-2013.
189
 Both the aired meetings and the 
strategy paper hinged on ASEAN. ASEAN was also key to the subsequent EU’s policy-making on 
Myanmar, namely the 2013 Comprehensive Framework. In that document, the EU pledged to assist 
Myanmar’s government with rebuilding its place in the international community (p. 2), and also 
promised to support it in reaping the benefits of integration within ASEAN.
190
 Again, it appears that 
Myanmar helped to reinforce the long-lasting EU-ASEAN relationship rather than endangering the 
EU’s ties with ASEAN.  
 
Conclusions  
 
EU behaviour vis-à-vis Myanmar via EU-ASEAN displayed an element of continuity in terms of the 
EU’s constant concern to avoid that the Myanmar issue destabilise its relations with ASEAN. As the 
interviewees confirmed, it was clear that the desire to get away from influential China together with the 
appeal for new partners were crucial in bringing about the changes. These have been identified as 
falling into three different phases. First, the EU insisted on sanctioning Myanmar, and ASEAN on 
rejecting the censure of Yangon’s regime by its EU dialogue partner. This setting was well-established 
during 1991-1997. The EU’s obstinacy in applying negative measures corresponded to ASEAN’s 
inflexibility in defending its opposition to the ‘external interference’ of the EU and to its good 
governance claim. Second, the EU moderated criticism of Myanmar and ASEAN distanced itself from 
rejecting the censure of the regime by its EU dialogue partner. These changes occurred during 1998-
2006. The Council of the European Union tried to use the two-pronged strategy of suspension and 
renewal of sanctions, and ASEAN demonstrated a change by starting to discuss Myanmar’s problems 
during its meetings with the EU, expressly making recommendations, and progressively relaxing the 
non-interference principle. The paper upheld that the latter change was backed by the Association’s 
preoccupation with the fact that Myanmar’s affairs might negatively impact on ASEAN’s integration 
project and standing. Third, the EU employed targeted sanctions and limited development cooperation, 
while ASEAN encouraged Myanmar’s better governance. These policies evolved during 2007-2012. 
The Commission’s Country Strategy Paper on Myanmar proved that the EU was less obstinate and 
immovable in its position of ‘merely continuously sanctioning’ Myanmar. It showed some openness in 
promoting local (non-state) actors’ contribution to the democratisation process. ASEAN, 
concomitantly, several times insisted to the military junta that a transition to democracy was expected 
by the Association.  
 
Informed by the idea of the evolution of the EU profile in world affairs through its political connections 
with ASEAN, this paper shed light on the Commission’s ‘attention to the EU’s perceived growing 
global weight’ and call ‘to raise its profile’ across Southeast Asia. However the evidence explored 
leads to the conclusion that the EU did not punch to its weight in the region.
191
 Investigations on Asian 
perceptions of the EU agree that the European Union is a global political actor ‘somewhere else’ in the 
world.
192
 With regard to Myanmar, as the Burmese interviewees indicated, the EU was an ‘unknown’ 
actor, or an agent which established a sort of negative publicity. Through the latest partnership strategy 
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the EU is finding new ways to raise its visibility as a motivating and inspiring referee. Whereas many 
scholars had dwelled on the difficulties caused by the Myanmar issue to the EU-ASEAN ties, no light 
was shed on the extent to which the Myanmar case had conversely helped to reinforce the long-lasting 
EU-ASEAN relationship. This is the original contribution of this paper.   
 
